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INTRODUCTION AND AIM OF THE STUDY. 
There has been a tremendous amount of psychologi-
cal literature dealing with response sets, biases, and 
styles in the last few years (Jackson & Messick 1958; 
McGee 1962; Rorer 1965; O'D.onovan 1965 ). That such 
a phenomenon exists seems pre'tty well established al-
though Rorer (1965) has cast some doubts on the method-
ological adequacy of many of the research designs used. 
A large part of the research reported has been conc~rn-
ed with the response biases or test taking attitudes in 
per~onality, interest and attitude inventories, where 
the subject shows a more or less consistent tendency to 
make a particular kind of response to a test. 
Biases have variously been described by such terms 
as "social desirability" (Edwards 1957b, 1959), "defen-
siveness" (Smith 1959), "self-disclosure" (Jourard 1959), 
"yeasaying" and "naysaying" (Couch & Keniston 1_960), 
"deviation" (Berg 1955, 1961), and "extreme position 
response bias" (Arthur 1966). 
Arthur (1965a) in his review found four different 
approaches used in explaining respqnse bias. They in-
clude Cronbach's (1950) emphasis on the form and content 
of the test; the statistical approach of Cronbach and 
Gleser (1953) which was developed by Berg (1961) and 
Barnes (1955) who have suggested that the individuals 
who are deviant from the norm on any one response mea-
sure tend to be deviant on a variety ·or statistically 
normative measures; the contributions of personality 
exemplified by Edwards (1957b); and the importance of 
human behaviour as a cognitive activity put forward by 
Arthur (1965a). This last mentioned takes up a not 
2. 
yet fully explored point of view which was first sug-
gested by Osgood et al.,. (1957), who pointed out that 
some subjects are extreme responders on the Semantic 
Differential, that is, they tend to check the extreme 
positions 1 and 7 more frequently than they check the 
other scale positions. They considered that intelli-
gence, age, emotionality, response conflict, anxiety, 
mental disorder (pp 226-236), and intensity of mediating 
reactions (pp 155-159) were some of the variables which 
contributed to the response style. 
While there is no evidence that intelligence affects 
response style (Ware 1958; Neuringer 1963), it has been 
shown that age is important, children and old people 
tending to make more extreme responses (Arthur 1965b); 
(Donahoe 1962). It is not clear at present to what 
extent the other factors suggested by Osgood et al. 
(1957) are independent variables. 
Arthur (1965~) in putting forward explanatory hy-
·potheses, found that the form of the semantic differen-
tial tends to encourage extreme responses in psychiatric 
patients. This finding reduces the significance of the 
extreme response bias in a judgement situation and sug-
gests that some portion of the bias is the result of the 
specific test form rather than of judgement. This con-
clusion is in line with Cronbach's (1950) obser ✓ati~n 
that response sets become more inflvential as the test 
items become more difficult or ambiguous. In addition 
Arthur (1965a) found that the failure of discrimination 
hypothesis put forward by Kelley et al. (1955) was not 
tenable when applied to the semantic differential in a 
psychiatric setting. 
The present study is an extension of Arthur's 
(1965a) work and its aim is to throw light on the nature 
of the extreme re~ponse bia~. It attempts to show firs~ 
that psychiatric patients can be differentiated into two 
groups in ter~s of extreme responses in an absolute judge-
ment.situation (s~mantic differential), and secondly, 
that the groups so differentiated will also differ in 
4o 
their judgements as shown by a scaling of their respon-
ses in a paired comparisons judgement situation. It 
was expected that if extreme responders were character-
ized by some different processes of judgement from non-
extreme responders, then in a paired comparisons situa-
tion where extremeness is not allowed by the nature of 
the task, they might allocate different values to the 
concepts to be judged or use different scale widths, 






The first problem is to find whether patients 
differentiated in terms of extreme responses fall into 
a natural group; that is whether their intermediate 
responses are non-overlapping with non-extreme while 
they do not diff~~ in the use of neutral positions. 
There is well documented evidence that psychiatric pa-
tients tend to be extreme raters (Lewis & Taylor 1955; 
Berg & Collier 1953; Zax et al., 1964; Barnes 1955; 
Borgatta & Glass 1961 ). It has also been shown that 
among patients, psychotics tend to be more extreme than 
neurotics (Arthur 1966; Parsonson 1965), and neurotics 
more than normals (Wertheimer & McKinner 1952), thus it 
is expected that in an unselected ~roup of psychiatric 
patients there would be a wide range of responses. The 
standard semantic differential was chosen as a measure 
of extreme response because both Arthur (1966) an<l Par-
sonson (1965) have shown that this instrument can differ-
entiate certain psychiatric patients in terms of response. 
bias. In addition it may be of clinical value to know 
the nature of response bias in the semantic differential 
~hich measures me~ning. Using an unselected group of 
psychiatric patients, but excluding mental defective and 
6. 
older patients over 50 years on the grounds that they 
might not understand sufficiently the pature of the task, 
it was hypothesised that two groups would be identified 
by response bias, these groups to be labelled· "Extreme" 
and "Non-extreme" respectively. 
The second problem was to measure the evaluative 
judgement.continua of the two groups differentiated by 
response bias on the semantic differential. It was 
thought desirable' to keep the task as close to the sem-
antic differential as possible and yet at the same time 
eliminate the extreme position response 'per se'. To 
this end the method of paired comparisons was chosen, 
enabling a patient to make judgements in terms of each 
pole of the evaluative dimension, good and bad, at 
separate times. Thus, not only would patients judge 
which of two concepts was "better", but at a different 
point in time they would judge which of those two con-
, .. .- ' 
cepts was "worse". It was hypothesised that the Ex-
treme and Non-extreme groups would differ in their under-
lying scaling behaviour on an evaluative dimension where 
extreme judgements were not possible. 
Osgood et al~ (1957) have assumed that the adjec-
tive pairs they used in their semantic differential are 
bipolar or symmetric around a neutral point. On the 
basis of this assumption it was hypoth.esised that the 
scaling of the "worse" judgements from a given group 
< 
when reversed would not differ significantly from the 
7 .• 
"better" judgements for the same group. 





THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
For purposes of differentiating the extreme 
raters from non~extreme raters three major dimensions 
of "Evaluation", "Potency" and "Activity", found by 
Osgood et al. (1957) in their factor analysis were rep-
resented in the semantic differential scales used (see 
Table 1 ). The seven standard concepts used were ad-
apted from those employed in the Thesaurus sampling of 
the semantic differential by Osgood et al. ( 195 7) and 
also by Arthur (1966). The concepts were always judg-









Form II of the semantic differential was used 
allowing one concept to each page, all the scales being 
·set out below the! concept (see Table 1 ). The order and 
direction from left to right of the ten scales was 
balanced out for each dimension and was maintained 
throughout the series. 
TABLE 
Example of a page of the Semantic Differential 
FLOWER 
kind . . • . . • - - -
passive • . . . -·-
good . . . 
weak . . -
true 
fast 
hard . . -
ugly . . - . - . 
wise . . -












Each subject was given a standard set of semantic 
differential instructions on a cyclostyled sheet (shown 
in Appendix I) wh~ch was adapted from Osgood et al. (1957). 
The experimenter read through the instructions with the 
subject, who was required to ·"check" the form in the ap-
propriate manner in order to learn how the scales were to 
be "checked" on the actual test form. 
THE PAIRED COMPARISONS 
Thirteen concepts were selected from a pre-
vious scaling stu·~y by Arthur ( 1965c) using ratings on 
1 o. 
a standard semantic differential. On the basis of this 
study, the chosen concepts had known scale values distri-
buted over the entire range of the "good-bad" dimension, 
with a fairly even spread. 
with their scale values. 










Scale values of concepts on a 11 good-bad 11 
dimension of the Semantic Differential 
( Arthur 1 965 c) 
Scale Value Concept Scale Value 
o. 225 DIRT 4.236 
0.912 DANGER 4.43 7 
1 • 5 1 2 PAIN 4. 63 9 
I 
2. 211 ABORTION 4. 854 
3. 129 DEVIL 5.205 
3. 603 TORTURE 5.590 
3~ 984 
The thirteen concepts were paired in all possible 
combinations, inc~uding the position of the concept in 
the pair, thus giving a total of 156 comparisons in all, 
1 1 • 
that is, 24 judgements on each of the thirteen concepts. 
The comparisons were made by means of cards on each of 
which a pair of c?ncepts were typed in capitals. In 
addition, the cards were ordered so th~t the concepts 
in any given pair did not occur in the previous or the 
following pairs. 
for all subjects. 
The order of presentation was the same 
The verbal responses of each subject 
were recorded by the examiner on a prepared data sheet 
as shown in Appendix II. Each subject was required to 
make judgements on all the concepts on two separate 
occasions, in the one case the judgement was to be made 
in terms of which was "better", and on the other which 
was "worse 11 • Subjects were randomly assigned to two 
groups, group 1 making the "better" judgements first, 
and group 2 making the judgement "worse" first. All 
subjects were givJn a typed form with the following in-
structions which were read aloud by the examiner: 
"In this test you are required to compare pairs 
of words. tirst think of what each word in the 
pair·means to you, and then say which one you con-
sider 'better'. Now look at the first pair of 
words, 'PEACE' and 'FLEA'. Think of what each 
means to you: now say which you consider 'better' 
If you are not sure, guess". 
(Note: 'worse• was substituted for 
'better' when judgements of 'worse' 
I 
were to be made). 
DESIGN 
S.ubjects. 
Forty-four unselected patients at a large 
mental hospital were tested, the sample being made up 
of 19 males and 25 females. Old, i.e. over 50 years, 
organic and mentally defective patients were excluded. 
I 
Controlled Variables. 
Measures were taken of age and intelligence. 
Age in years was given by the patient. Intelligence. 
was measured on t,he Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
Vocabulary sub-test, the raw score only being used. 
. I 
The vocabulary was thought to be the most appropriate 
1 2. 
measure considering the verbal nature of the experimen-
tal tasko (Note: Tables giving the mean age and in-
telligence of the 1experimental groups are given under 
"Results" since the composition of the groups was not 
determined until their responses in the Semantic Dif-
~erential test had been analysed). 
1 3 • 
Order of Testing. 
Every patient was given the .W.A.I.S. vocabulary 
firsto This was. done so that the mental defectives 
could be eliminated at an early stage •. No subjects 
were in fact eliminated. This was followed by the 
Paired Comparison~ judgements in terms of 'better' or 
'worse' depending on whether the patient had been assign-
ed to group 1 or group 2. The Semantic Differential 
was then administered, and the testing was completed 
with the Piired Compa~isons judging 'worse' or 'better'. 




DIFFERENTIATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 
The responses of the 44 subjects tested on 
the Semantic Differential were summed into individual 
frequency scores on categories 1 and 7 (extreme), 2, 
3, 5 and 6 (non-e~treme), and 4 (neutral). 
pendix III for the individual frequencies. 
See Ap-
Figure 
shows the distribution of frequencies for extreme, 
neutral and non-extreme positions. This graph did 
not show any clear bimodal distributions and there was 
no certainty that subjects with a moderately high fre-
quency in the extreme categories would not also have 
' 
a considerable frequenc1 in the non-extreme categories. 
-To obtain this condition it was decided to determine 
cut-off points which would produce a maximum number of 
subjects in each group with no overlap between the 
groups by plotting the frequency of response in the ex-
treme category against frequency in the non-extreme 
category as shown in Figure 2. By inspection, the best 
cut-offs were found to be as follows: 
Extreme Group: 35 and above on categories 1 and 7. 
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Non-extreme Group: 20 and above on categories, 2,3, 
5 and 6. 
below 35 on categories 1 and 7. 
The use of these two cut-off points divided the sub-
jects into three distinct groups of approximately equal 
numbers. It is of course arbitrary to divide the sub-
jects into groups in terms of extremity of response, 
thus it was necessary to ascertain whether those groups 
identified by frequency usage of the extreme and non-
extreme categories, also differed in respect of their 
use of the neutral category. Figure 3 shows complete 
overlap between the groups in checkiqg the neutral posi-
tion 4, and no overlap in checking the other positionso 
This meant that the differences between the two groups 
were accounted for in their use of the extreme and non-
extreme positions. 
It is to be noted that the residual group (neither 
extreme nor non-extreme) is not within the focus of in-
terest of the present study and thus no analysi~ was 
carried out on their responses. Nevertheless, the 
smallness of this group emphasises the fact that ex-
treme and non-extreme raters are not some minor ends 



































of Groups by Frequency 
of Scale Position Usage. 
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1 & 7. 
15 20 25 30 ll 40 45 50 55 60 65 
19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 70 
Frequency of using stated Scale Positions. 
parts of the distribution. 
A summary of the composition of the three groups 
by age, sex, intelligence (raw scores) and frequency 
of response in the extreme, non-extreme and neutral 
categories can be found in Table 3. A 't' test was 
conducted on the Extreme and Non-extreme groups and 
the results of this have been included in Table 3. 
The only significant differences between the two 
groups were those on the usage frequencies of the ex-





Composition of groups by mean age, sex, intelligence and frequency 





FREQUENCY 1 & 7 
FREQUENCY 4 
FREQUENCY 2·, 3, 





2 7. 0 7.99 
50.3 14.60 
20. 3 1 o. 29 
16.9 8.63 
32.5 11.50 




X S. D. 
32.8 9.51 
49.0 14. 1 9 
47. 6 9.78 






30. 0 8.50 
48. 1 13 ;15 
23.3 5.35 
35.5 9. 71 






7. 2 80 * 
o. 073 
7.440 * 
"" 0 . 
21. 
SCALING 
The scaling was carried out under the assumptions 
of Case V for incomplete data on a paired comparison 
(Edwards 1957a). Appendix IV shows the raw data from 
which the scaling was dpne. The scale values for the 
two groups and two judgement conditions are in Table 
\ 
4. Figure 4 shows these scale values plotted against 
a unit rank order taken from the non~extreme group 
judging 'better'.· As can be seen there are large 
differences in the width of scale between the two 
groups both in their judgements in terms of 'better' 
and in terms of 'worse'. A Mann-Whitney 'U' Test (Sie-
gel 1956) was carried out on the differences between the 
scale values. The differences between the Extreme and 
Non-extreme groups for both 'better' and 'worse' judg-
ing conditions were found to be significant (see Table 
5). Thus the hypothesis that the Extreme and Non-ex-
treme groups would differ in their scaling on an evalu-
ative dimension Where extreme judgements are not pos-
sible is confirmed. 
Table 5 also shows that there is no significant 
difference within the two groups over the two judging 
conditions, 'worse' and 'better'. This confirms the 
22. 
TABLE 4 
Scale values from paired comparisons 
c·oncept : Better Worse* 
Non-extreme Extreme: Non-extreme Extreme 
PEACE 0.000 I 0.000 0.000 0.003 
FATHER o. 849 0.041 ~ • 141 0.000 
BATH o. 868 o. 1 91 1 .• 22 8 0.224 
LEMON 1 • 1 7 8 o. 744 1. 485 o. 5 85 
WINTER 1. 936 o. 772 2.287 1. 070 
DARK 2. 148 o.788 2. 3 92 0.991 
FLEA 2.419 1 • 2 1 7 2.764 1 • 2 61 
DIRT 2. 725 1. 323 3.142 1. 432 
PAIN 3.096 1. 431 3.452 · 1 • 5 70 
DANGER 3. 1 98 1 • 3 91 3. 756 1. 64 7 
DEVIL 3.808 1. 985 4.096 1 • 965 
TORTURE 3.966 1. 72 8 4.461 1 • 96 8 
ABORTION 4.008 1. 91 0 4.408 2. 1 03 





Scale Values of the Extreme & 
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hypothesis that the scaling of the 'worse' judgements 
from a given group when reversed would not differ sig-
nificantly from the 'better' judgements for the same 
group. 
Since the major interest was in measuring mean 
differences in the scaling behaviour of the two groups, 
and not in preserving the individual identities of the 
scale values, it was decided to use the Mann-Whitney 'U' 
test as the most aporopriate method of determining the 
significance of such differences. Table 5 shows that 
there were· statistically significant differences in the 
scaling behaviour of the Extreme and N~n-extreme groups 
under both better and worse judging conditions. 
other hand, the differences between better and worse 
judgements of each group were found to pe not significant. 
Using the Wilcoxon test (Siegel, 1956) which 
preserves the individual identities of the scales, it 
was found that the difference between better and worse 
judgements for both the Extreme and Non-extreme groups 
was statistically significant. The disparity in the 
results from these two non-parametric tests suggests that 
the difference being measured by Wilcoxon,although real 
in a statistical sense, is not of sufficient magnituae 
to be psychologically useful or clinic~lly useful and it 
has thus been disregarded. 
TABLE 5 
Mann-Whitney 1 U1 test on the difference~ 
between the scale values 
24. 
'U' signif. 
Extreme Bettef v Non-extreme 
Better 
Extreme Worse v Non-extreme 
Worse 
Extreme Better v: Extreme 
24.5 p < .002 
32.5 p < .02 
Worse 95.5 N.S. 
Non-extreme Better v Non-
Extreme Worse 99.5 N.S. 
hypothesis that the scaling of the 'worse' judgements 
from a given group when· reversed would not differ sig-
nificantly from ~he 'better' judgements for the same 
grqup. 
25. 
ANALYSIS OF SCALING DIFFERENCES 
Having found a significant difference between the 
scale-values of ~he Extreme and Non-extreme groups it ' 
was necessary to explore the possible reasons or ex-
planations for this difference. It was noted from 
their scale values, that for the Extreme group the con-
cepts used were much closer together than they were for 
the Non-extreme group. This narrowing of the scales 
obtained from Paired Comparisons can only occur as a 
result of increased dispersion of judgements. The in-
creased dispersion may be due to the judgements being 
more inconsistent in the Extreme group in at least two 
ways: first, the individual judge may be inconsistent, 
that is, his value ordering is inconsistent. Secondly, 
the individual while being highly consistent in himself, 
I 
does not agree with the rest of the group he is in, 
that is, he is not consistent with the group as a whole. 
To measure the first type of inconsistency it was 
necessary to dete~mine the degree to which the paired 
comparison choices of each judge w~re consistent with 
his simple rank ordering of the concepts, and then to 
see whether the E~treme group were as consistent in 
26. 
this .respect .as were the Non-extreme group. Kendall 
(1948) has shown that if a subject expresses prefe('ences 
for three objects, X, Y, Z, as X<Y<Z<X then it can be 
said that the triad X, Y, Z, is 'circular' or 'inconsis-
tent'. The more circular triads there are, the further 
the departure from a ranking situation toward a position 
of inconsistency where ranking does not occur. Table 
6 shows the number of c~rcular triads for individual 
! 
subjects of the two groups under both judging condi-
tionso A Mann.-Whitney 'U' Test was·used to test 
whether the two independent groups have been drawn 
from the same population. The result snown in Table 
6 indicated that there was no significant difference be-
tween the groups in'the degree of inconsistency either 
for judgements of 'better' or for 'worse'. The raw 
data for the calculation of the circular triads is 
shown in Appendix V. 
The second type of inconsistency, that is the 
homogeneity of the groups, was measured by taking the 
means and standard deviations of the frequency with 
which each concept was judged as 'better' and as 'worse' 
for each group and these are summarised in Table 7. 
The raw data for this calculation is shown in Appendix 
TABLE 6 
Number of circular triads for individual 
subjects and Mann-Whitney 'U' values 






























































'U' 108 N.S. 
2 7 0 
TABLE 7 
Means and standard deviations of judge men ts 'better' and 'worse' 
for each concept by each group 
Concept 'Better' 'Worse'* 
Non-extreme Extreme Non-extreme Extreme 
X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X. S.D. 
PEACE 23.26 1 • 1 0 20.40 5.90 23.60 0.63 . 20. 73 5.22 
FATHER 20.20 3.32 20.13 5.42 20. 13 3.42 20. 86 5.13 
, . 
BATH 1 9. 73 1. 22 1 8.46 4.79 1 9. 40 1.45 1 8. 86 3.89 
LEMON 1 8. 33 1.35 14.66 5. 01 1 8. 53 1. 55 16.60 5.48 
WINTER 14. 73 1. 1 9 14.53 3.82 14.53 1.77 12., 73 2.96 
DARK 13.86 2. 39 14.13 --4.12 14.40 3.29 13.46 3.50 
FLEA 12.00 2.80 1 o. 73 4.30 11. 73 3. 03 10.80 3.84 
DIRT 9. 93· 3.30 9.80 2.76 10.00 2.10 10.46 3.56 _ 
PAIN 7.93 2.31 8.60 4.79 8.93 2.09 8.80 5.00 
DANGER 7. 13 2.87 9.13 4.95 6.26 1.67 s.oo 4.28 
DEVIL 3.,53 2. 75 4. 33 3.54 3. 86 3.40 5.40 4.79 
TORTURE 2.86 2.26 6 .. 20 6. 1 1 2.46 1. 73 5.13 5.68 
ABORTION 2.46 2 .. 82 4. 86 6.13 2.80 2. 3 7 4.13 4.58 





V. A low standard deviation suggests a homogeneous 
group and the standard deviation increases as the group 
gets less homogeneous or more inconsistent. A Mann-
Whitney 'U' Test on the distributions of means and 
standard deviations (see Table 8) showed that while the 
distributions of the means were not significantly dif-
ferent, the distributions of the standard deviations 
for the Extreme and Non-extreme groups were highly sig-
nificant, the· Extreme group having the larger standard 
deviations and thus being the more heterogeneous group. 
TABLE 8 
Mann-Whitney, 'U' Test on the differences 
between distributions of means and stan-
dard deviations (S.D.) 
'u' 'u' 
Means Signif. S.D. Signif. 
Extreme Better v Non-extreme 
Better 84 N.S. 70 N.S. 
Extreme Worse V Non-extreme 
Worse 85 N ;s. 94 N.S. 
Extreme Better V Extreme 
Worse 82 N.S. 4 p <- 002. 
Non-extreme Better v Non-
Extreme Worse 83 N.S. 4 p <. 002 
TABLE Sa 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test on the 
within group differences between distributions 
of means and standard deviations 





















DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The first aim of this study was ~o show that psy-
chiatric patient~ can be differentiated into two groups 
in terms of extreme responses with the extreme respon-
ders falling naturally into a different category from 
the rest in respect of checking extreme positions but 
not of the neutral position. The frequency usage of 
the extreme positions on the Semantic Differential was 
thus expected to give a bimodal distribution. However 
the results show that there is no such bimodality, 
rather the obtained curve is multimodal necessitating 
the use of a rather arbitrary method of selecting cut-
off points for differentiating the groups. Neverthe-
less the division used, (that of choosing a cut-off 
point which placed maximum numbers in each group with 
no overlap), see~s to make a natural distinction since 
the groups have been shown not to differ in their use 
of the neutral category. 
It appears from the results that there are actual-
ly three types of raters, Extreme, Non-extreme and 
Neutral. The present study was not aimed at demonstrat-
ing the existence of a neutral group, neither has it in-
vestigated the judgemental behaviour of such a group. 
n 
31 • 
However it does suggest that this group should be taken 
into account in future studies, the expectation being 
that in number it would comprise one third of any un-
selected sample from a psychiatric population, the 
other two-thirds being equally spread between the ex-
treme and non-extreme raters. 
The major interest of this study was to investi-
gate the possibility that the extreme response bias is 
attributable at least in part to a difference in the 
cognitive judgement process. It was postulated that 
such a difference would show itself when the scaled com-
parative judgements of a group of extreme responders 
were compared with 1the judgements of a group of non-ex-
treme responders. The results indicate that there is 
a clear difference in the scale widths of the Extr~me 
and Non-extreme groups for judging as 'better 1 (p <. 002) 
and vworse' ( p <. 02). However a further analysis of 
the nature of this difference reveals that while both 
groups are highly 1consistent in their judgements, the 
responses of the Extreme group are more heterogeneous, 
and in c-0nsequence the width of scale is narrowed for 
this group. The ,difference in scaling could be explain-
ed entirely by this variation in the homogeneity of 
32. 
response, and therefore the study does not throw any 
light on the nature of the extreme response bias from 
the point of view of cognitive variables like judgement. 
The main contribution of the present study is in 
demonstrating that extreme raters are more heterogeneous 
in th~ meanings they attribute to ordinary concepts. 
This is not to say that the subjects are different, but 
they do give a greater variety of meaning to certain con-
cepts. The scaling approach used in the present study 
is sensitive to even minor shifts in meaning, especially 
where small groups are used. In the present study the 
groups were small enough (only 15 in each) for one or 
two subjects rating with a reversed meaning polarity on 
some of the words to have a great effect on the total dis-
persion, and ictually collapse the width of the scale. 
Appendix V shows the frequency of judging the con-
cepts as 1 better' and 'worse' for the Extreme and Non-
extreme groups. In each case the concepts are placed 
in rank order according to scaled values from the given 
group and judging condition. By inspection of these 
tables it can be seen that subjects Nos. 14 and 1s· in 
·the Extreme group1both reversed the meaning pol~rity of 
the concepts on~ considerable number of times. Other 
330 
subjects in the Extreme group show a similar trend to a 
lesser degree. 
It is interesting to note that the two subjects 
14 and 15 who gave the most reversals have both done 
acts of self mutilation and made numerous attempts at 
suicide. They considered 'better' such concepts as 
'torture', 'pain' and 'abortion', while 'bath', 'father' 
and 'peace' were· considered as 'worse 1 • The fact that 
they reversed the polarity of those concepts which ap-
pear relevant to their symptoms, indicates that meaning-
fulness may be an important variable in the extreme res-
ponse. Extreme responses may reflect high intensity of 
meaning. A few other subjects also tended to reverse 
the polarity of such concepts as 'danger', 'devil' and 
'torture'. 
Further research is indicated in two areas. First 
is to investigate the judgemental behaviour of the 'Neutral' 
group found in this study, and secondly to explore the ef-
fects of the rnearl1ngfulness of concepts related to a given 
symptomatology and extreme response by comparing the res-
ponses of normals with patients having the given symptoms. 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There has been considerable evidence in the litera-
ture for. the existence of extreme response bias and for 
its correlates with pathology and personality. The 
present study however sets out to investigate the psycho-
logical nature of the extreme response by having extreme 
and non-extreme responders make judgements on a task 
which does not allow extreme responses. 
The aim was first to distinguish groups of extreme 
and non-extreme responders by using a task which per-
mitted graded responses in terms of intensity (the Sem-
i 
antic Differential), and 1then to measure the evaluative 
' judgement continua by scaling the res'.ponses of these 
two groups from a task where extreme responses are not 
possible (the Paired Comparisons). The hypothesis 
wa~ that since extreme and non-extreme respon~ersdif-
fer in their graded responses they may also differ in 
the behaviour which is measured by scaling. 
The extreme ind non-extreme groups were arbit-
rarily distinguished by the frequency with which they 
used the extreme and non-extreme categories in the Sem-
~ntic Differential. It was found that three distinct 
groups were obtained, the third group having their 
35. 
responses maihly in the neutral category. 
Case V scaling procedure of the Paired Comparisons 
judgements revealed a difference in the width of scales 
the extreme group.having a narrower scale than the non-
extreme group • Dispersion of responses was studied 
. and the extreme· group was found to be the more hetero-
geneous ~n this respect. Since the scaling difference 
can be most satisfactor1ly explained in terms of the 
greater heterogen~ity of response in the extreme group, 
' 
it must be concluded that the difference does not throw 
any light on the na~ure of the extreme response. 
It was observed t~at there was a reversal in.the 
polarity of some of the concepts by a number·of extreme 
raters, and this seemed to be related to their symptomso 
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Instructions for. the Semantic Differential 
APPENDIX II 
Data recordirig sheet for the Paired Comparisons 
APPENDIX III 
Subjects by ~ge, Sex, Intelligence and Fre-
quency of Scale Position Usage on the Semantic 
· Differential 
APPENDIX IV 
Frequency of 'better' and 'worse' Paired 
Comparisons responses on all concepts for 
Extreme and Non-extreme groups 
APPENDIX V 
Frequency of 'better' and 'worse' Paired 
Comparisons fesponses for individual subjects 
I 
APPENDIX I 
IN JTRUCT IONS FOR THE 3EliiANT IC DIFFER2:NT Ifi.L 
The purpose of this test is to see what certain things mean to 
various people by having them judge them against descriptive adjectives. 
In taking this test please make your judgements according to what these 
things mean to .Y..2.!!• On each page of this booklet you will find a 
different thing to be judged and beneath it a number of lines with ad-
jectives to judge agP-inst, You are to judge the thing on each of the 
lines, Here is how you judge the lines, 
If you feel that the thing at the top of the page ls very like one· 






If you feel that the thing is ~ulte like one end of the line (but 






If the thing seems only slightly like one end as opposed to the 






The end toward whic.h you check, of course, depends on which of the 
two ends of the line seem better to describe the thing you're judging, 
If you think the thing you arc judging to be neutral as regards the 
adjectives, or if the adjectives are completely irrelevant, not related 
to the thing, then you should put your check-mark in the middle: 
kind cruel 
Important 
1. Be sure you check every line of each page of the booklet do not 
omit any 
2, Never put more th~n one check-mark on a single line, 
'"'ork quickly through the test. Do not worry or puzzle over in-
dividual items, it is your first impressions, the immediate 11 feelings 11 
nbout the items, that we want. On tho oth~r hund, please do not be 
careless because we want your true impressions. 
APPENDIX II 
Peace - Flea 5? ;ibortion - Devil 105 Peace - Dark 
2 Abortion - '.linter' 54 ·.;inter - Father 106 Abortion - Lemon 
3 Lemon - Pain 55 Lemon:.. Abortion 107 Lemon - Devil 
4 ·:linter - Danger 56 Devil - Danger 108 '.,inter - Peace 
5 Devil - rorture 57 Torture - Peace 109 Devil - Flea 
6 Bath - Peace 58 Bath - Dant;er 110 Bath - Father 
7 Torture - Father 59 DL0 t - Pain 111 Torture - Danger 
8 Dirt-:- Devil 60 Dark Lemon 112 Dirt - Abortion 
9 Pain - Father 61 Pain - Torture 113 Fain - Danger 
10 Dark - Devil 62- Flea - Dirt 114 Dark - ·.1nter 
11 Flea - Bath 63 Danger - I<'ather 115 Flea - Peace 
12 F'ather - Aborti'ln 64 Peace~ Abortion 116 Father - Pain 
13 Danger - Bath· 65 Father - Devil 117 Danger - Peace 
14 Peace.,. Lemon 66 Abortio,\ - Dirt 118 Abortion - Pain 
15 Ab1rtion.- Bath 67 Lemon - Bath 119 Peace - Devil 
16 ~linter . ..:. . Dark 68 '.,inter - Flea 120 Lem<'n - Dirt 
17 Bath - Torture. 69 Devil -· Dark 121 \linter - Torture 
18 Devil - Viinter 70 Tortur~-- Winter 122 Devil - Lemon 
19 Tortu.re - Flea . 71 Bath - Dark 123 Bath - Flea 
20 Dirt - Father 72 Dirt - Peace 124 'l'c:,rture - Dark 
21 Pain - Flea 73 Pain - Winter 125 Dirt - Bath 
22 Dark - .Dirt 74 Flea·_ Father 126 Pain - Dark 
23 F]e!f-.- Danger 75 Dark - Pain 127 Flf-a - Torture 
24 Dani;er - Dark 76 Danger - Flea 128 Dark - Abortion 
25 Father - Bai?h 77 Father - Dirt 129 Danger - Torture 
26 P13ace - . Pain 78 Peace - Bath 130 Father '- Peace 
27 Abortion. - Danger 79 Abortion - · -F'ather 1 ~1 Uinter - Abortion 
28 ,Lemon - Torture 8) Lemon - Danger 132 Peace - Dirt 
29 \lint~r - Devil 81 Devil - Dirt · 133 Lemon - Father . ' ' ' . 
3') Torture - Lemon, 82 '/1inter - Lemon 134 ,\bortion - Peace 
31 Devil :- Abortio,n 83 Bath - Devil 135 Devil - Pain 
32 Bath.- ~'1intf'r 84 'J:'<,rture - J,bo rt ion 136 Bath - Lemen 
33 Dirt - ri'ea 85 Lemon - Peace 137 Torture -, Devil · 
34 Pain - Lem:,n 86 Dirt - Torture 138 Dirt - Dark 
35 Dark - _:Father 87 Pain - Abortion 139 Pain - Devil 
36 D~ng~r - ,Devil · 88 Dark - Peace 140 Dark - Bath 
37 P'lea :-:- Dark" . 89 Flea - Lemon 11i1 Fl-1a - Winter 
38 Father, .- DangE:°r 90 Peace - Danger 142 Father - Torture 
39 Peac.e :- T'lrture 91 .-.bortion - Fha 143 Danger - Vlinter 
40 .Aborti'ln -_Dark 92 DangJr - Leinon 144 Peace - Father 
41 Le,n~n - \vinter 93 Pather - :!!'lea 145 ,~bortir-n - Torture 
42 Devil - Bath 94 Lemon - Dark 146 Lemon -- Flea 
43 Winter - Dirt 95 Y<intor - Pain 147 ',,inter - Bath 
44 Bath - ,,bortion 96 Devil - Father 148 Devil - Peaoe 
45 Tortur0 - Pain 97 Bath - Dirt 149 Bath - Pain 
46 Dirt - Lemon 98 Dark ·_ 'l'orture 150 Torture - Dirt 
q Pain - Peace 99 Pain - Bath 151 Dark - Danger 
48 Dark.- Flea 100 Dirt - Winter 1.52 Pain - Dirt 
49 Danger - Dirt 101 Torture - Bath 1.53 Flea - .-bortirn 
.50 Flea -.Devil 102 Flea -· Pain· 154 Dirt - Danger 
51 Fath,;,r - Da_rk 103 Father - Lemon 155 Father - Winter 






1 and 7 
4 
2, 3, 5 
and 6 
APPENDIX II I. 
Individual ·subjects by age, intelligence 
( vocabulary raw score), sex, and- fre-
quency of scale position usage on the Se-
mantic Differential 
EXTREME GROUP 
2 3 4 5 6 1 2 14 . 15 1 7 
15 22 38 1 9 29 39 39 21 27 45 
45 29 47: 54 . 52 68 59 67 52 48 
M F F F M M M F F F 
scale position usage 
57 40 41 37 41 46 36 54 55 55 
10 30 29 23 1 9 24 1 7 1 6 2 1 1 
.3. 0 0 1 0 10 0 1 7 () 13 4 
" 
43. 
1 8 .1 9 20 41 43 
38 36 39 45 41 
74 2 1 39 33 4( 
F F F F 
39 69 61 39 4 
26 9 16 




Subject No. 7 10 1 1 13 28 29 30 3 1 32 33 34 35 37 38 421 
I 
Age 29 31 29 1 8 29 27 40 28 15 1 8 25 22 
1 
1 7 33 44, 
I 
Intelligence 44 48 52 74 69 28 59 37 58 37 51 37 27 67 67j 
Sex F F F F F F M M M M M M M F ~ 
Frequency. of scale positiion usage 
1 and 7 1 7 29 30 22 31 .34 29 13 8 8 9 1 1 33 4 
4 24 20 1 1 24 9, 15 7 1 9 0 31 7 28 1 6 27 
2, 3, 5 







Subject No. 21 22 23 · 24 25 26 27 8 9 16 36 39 40 44 
Age 44 23 21 \ 23 33. 28 40 39 15 27 37 29 39 21 
Intelligence 54 63 42 34 48 26 56 60 32 72 60 46 50 31 
Sex F F F F M M F F F M M M F M 
I 
Frequency of scale position usage 
and 7 7 12 22 14 25 22 26 27 29 34 30 30 21 27 
4 52 . 40 40 I 43 44 48 44 25 32 24 23 25 33 24 
2, 3, 5 
and 6 1 1 1 8 8 13 0 0 1 8 9 12 1 7 15 16 1 9 
Concept No. 









1 o. Pain 
1. 1 • Peace 
1 2. Torture 
1 3. Winter 
APPENDIX IV 
Frequency of judging row 'better' than 
column for the Non-extreme group 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
• 0 5 1 1 2 0 1 0 5 
. 
30 • 30 27 30 29 10 29 22 30 
25 0 • 3 24 9 2 1 1 1 
29 3 27 29 24 3 22 27 
I. 
19 0 .6 • 3 2 5 
28 1 21 6 27 .. 4 9 3 1 9 
30 20 29 27 29 26 • 29 23 28 
29 28 8 28 21 . 0 27 
30 8 29 29 29 27 7 30 • 29 
25 0 1 9 3 25 1 1 2 3 . 
30 27 30 30 30 30 25 30 28 30. 
1 9 1 0 15 3 0 ·o 2 
29 3 28 1 7 30 26 3 22 5 . 28 
46. 
1 1 12 13 Row 
Sum 
0 1 1 1 37 
3 29 27 296 
0 29 2 107 
0 30 13 208 
O· 1 5 0 53 
0 27 4 149 
5 30 27 303 
0 29 8 180 
2 30' 25 2 75 
0 28 2 1 1 9 
29 30 349 
0 43 
0 30 • 221 
47. 
APPENDIX IV 
Frequency of judging row 'worse' than 
column for the Non-extreme group 
Concept No. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Abortion • 29 26 30 14 26 30 29 30 27 30 1 7 30 
'2 Bath • 0 I 1 0 0 22 2 7 ,2 30 0 4 
3 Danger 4 30 • 28 8 26 30 25 30 23 30 4 28 
4 Dark 0 29 2 • 3 5 24 10 23 3 30 0 15 
5 Devil 16 30 22 \ 2 7 • 24 30 30 30 23 30 12 28 
6 Dirt 4 30 4 25 6 • , 29 1 6 29 10 30 0 27 
7 Father 0 8 0 6 0 • 0 1 1 25; 0 6 
8 Flea 28 5 :20 0 14 30 • 30 6 30 1 1 9 
9 Lemon 0 23 0 7 0 1 9 0 • 0 29 1 2 
10 Pain 3 28 7 27 7 20 29 24 30 30 2 29 
1 1 Peace 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 
12 Torture 1 3 30 26 30 1 8 30 30 29 29 28 30 . 30 
1 3 Winter 0 26 2 15 2 3 24 11 28 30 0 • 
Column. sum 42 2 91 94 216 '58 150 302. 1 76 2 78 124 354 37 218 
Concept No. 









1 o. Pain 
1 1 • Peace 
1 2 • Torture 
1 3 • Winter 
APPENDIX IV 
Frequency of judging row 'better'· than 
column for the Extreme group· 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
• 2 10 3 15 4 3 2· 3 1 1 
28 • 26 23 28 27 8 28 29 26 
20 4 • 7 24 10 2 10 4 1 6 
27 7 23 • 26 25 7 21 10 22 
15 2 6 4 • 5 2 6 3 5 
26 3 20 5 25 2 14 3 1 9 
27 22 (28 1 23 28 28 • 27 28 26 
28 2 20 9 24 16 3 • 3 20 
27 1 25 20 27 28 2 27 • 23 
1 9 4 14 : 8 25 1 1 4 10 7 • 
28 20 27 25 28 28 1 7 28 25 28 
16 7 4 5 1 8 7 2 7 8 1 1 
26 9 20 : 16 27 24 6 19 1 7 24 
48. 
11 12 13 Row 
Sum 
2 14 4 73 
10 23 21 2 77 
3 26 10 137 
5- 25 14 212 
2 1 2 3 65 
2 23 6 147 
1 3 28 24 302 
2 23 1 1 1 61 
5 22 1 3 220 
2 1 9 6 1 29 
28 24 306 
2 . 6 93 
6 24 . 218 
49. 
APPENDIX IV 
Frequency of judging row 'worse' ·than 
column for the Extreme group 
Concept No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 1 2 13 
Abortion • 29 22 26 1 7 26 30 ·26 26 23 27 1 8 28 
2 Bath 1 • 2 ,, 3 3 4 23 1 10 2 22 2 4 : . 
3 Danger 8 28 • 24 9 21 28 22 24 1 7 26 6 26 
4 Dark 4 27 6 • 3 7 25 8 22 1 0 27 4 15 
5 Devil 13 27 21 27 • 21 29 23 28 23 28 15 24 
6 Dirt 4 26 9 23 9 • 27 15 26 1 1 28 5 20 
7 Father 0 7 2 5 l 3 • ·4 6 2 1 3 2 2 
I 
8 Flea 4 29 8 22 7 15 26 • 27 10 29 5 16 
9 Le JllOn 4 20 6 8 2 4 24 . 3 • 4 27 5 4 
10 Pain 7 28 13 20 7 1 9 28 ·20 26 • 28 9 23 
1 1 Peace 3 8 3 3 2 2 1 7 3 2 • 2 3 
12 Torture 12 28 24, 26 15 25 28 25 25 2 1 28 • 26 
13 Winter 2 26 4 15 6 10 28 14 26 7 27 4 • 
Column sum 62 2 83. 120 2 02 81 15 7 313 162 249 132 311 77 1 91 
so. 
APPENDIX V 
Frequency of· 'better' judgements for 
individual subjects in the Non-
extreme group 
\ 
Subject_ No~ 7 37 33 31 .32 34 35 38 42 10 1 1 13 28 29 30 
Concept 
PEACE 21 23 24 22 23 24 21 24 24 24 23 24 24 24 24 
FATHER 14 18 22 ·24 23 19 24 16 22 22 21 14 20 22 22 
BATH 1 8 21 20 1 8 1 9 20 .21 20 20. 20 20 21 21 20 1 7 
LEMON 1 7 21 16 t 9 1 8 io 1 7 1 9 18 t 8 t 7 t 8 1 9 1 8 20 
WINTER 15 1 7 13 13 12 14 15 13 12 16 1 8 1 7 14 16 16 
DARK 9 13 16 1 7 · 13 12 15 12 16 14 15 1 8 14. 11 13 
FLEA 8 6 11 12 13 1 7 12 16 13 12 12 13 9 14 12 
' 
DIRT 16 12 13 8 4 7 6 13 1 1 10 10 10 14 7 8 
PAIN 1 1 1,0 8 1 1 I 7 4 6 10 5 8 8 4 9· 9 9 
DXNGER 5 8 7 5 15 8" 10 6 7 -6 6 2 6 9 7 
DEVIL 8 5 0 5 5 6 2 o. 0 0 3 7 4 2 6 
TORTURE 6 ,2 4 01 4 0 7 2 5 4 3 0 2 4 0 
ABORTION 8 0 2 2 0 5 0 5 3 2 0 8 0 0 2 
\ 
(This data is frpm summing the rows on the Paired 




Frequency of 'worse' judgements for 




Subject No.7 37 33 31 32· 34 35 28 42 10 1 1 1 3 28 29 30 
Concept 
PEACE 23 24 24 22 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 24 23 24 24 
FATHER 20 22 22 24 23 21 22 16 23 20 1 8 15 12 22 22 
BATH 21 16 1 9 1 8; 20 1 7 20 20 1 9 20 1 9 21 21 20 20 
LEMON 1 9 1 7 1 7 . 1 8 1 8 21 16 21 1 7 1 8 22 1 7 21 1 8 1 8 
WINTER 1 3 15 14 1 6 15 10 15 15 14 1 2 15 16 1 7 16 1 5 
DARK 7 12 14 16 t 1 5 13 1 7 13 1 7 1 8 1 1 21 15 14 13 
FLEA 1 1 8 7 10 7 ·t 7 12 16 1 2 14 13 1 1 14 10 14 
DIRT 12 1 1 14 · 1 1 8 10 7 9 1 1 10 10 6 1 1 12 8 
PAIN 1 1 12 9 91. 11 6 7 8 4 8 9 6 8 8 8 
DANGER 1 1 5 7 6 10 7 8 8 7 6 6 4 4 6 6 
DEVIL. 6 1 1 0 2 3 4 3 0 0 7 8 8 2 3 
ABORTION 7 ,4 3\ 0 6 3 3 1 0 6 0 2 5 
TORTURE 2 2 5 1. 3 0 4 3 6 4 2 1 2 2 0 
(This data is from summing the columns on the Paired 
-Comparisons matrices for individual subjects) 
